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Introduction 
 
The present study intends to describe and analyze recent trends in foreign 
exchange markets, specifically the United States Dollar and the Euro relations as well as 
the fundamentals behind monetary assets. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
the United States Dollar kept its role as the premier international currency. Partially that 
was explained by the fact that there was no other currency that could rival against it. 
Neither, the Deutsche Mark, the British Pound nor the Japanese Yen were used in global 
transactions to the same extent. However, in 1999 the “Euro” was introduced and many 
scholars suggested the possibility that the new currency could eventually rival and 
surpassed the United States Dollar.  
This investigation is divided into three sections. To begin with a small 
introduction on the role of money is presented to provide a theoretical framework; 
including a bibliographic review and the presentation of current debates regarding foreign 
exchange markets and international currencies. Afterwards, the most recent currency 
trends are covered from both an historical and a theoretical perspective. The second 
section outsets the collapse of the “big dollar” in 2001/2002, followed by the 
explanations for its small rebound in 2005 and its later drop. In addition, this section aims 
to illustrate the increasing role of the Euro. 
The third section describes the latest financial crisis from a policy making 
perspective and analyzes how different policies in both sides of the Atlantic may 
influence the value of their currencies. Fundamentally, it presents short-run impacts as 
well as long-run concerns on the current financial crisis and its consequences in the 
foreign exchange markets.  
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1. What is money and what is International Money? 
 
1.a. Definition of Money 
 
Let’s begin with the basics. Money can be defined by its three main 
characteristics: a) Medium of Exchange, b) Unit of Account, and c) Store of value. The 
first characteristic implies that money is an accepted means of payment and therefore it 
can be “traded” for other goods and services. In this sense, money is efficient in reducing 
various transaction costs associated with direct trading or barter of goods and services. As 
stated by Krugman and Obstfeld (2008) the second characteristic of money allows for 
translating different countries’ money prices into comparable terms since it is a widely 
recognized measure of value. Finally, money can be used in order to transfer purchasing 
power; hence, it is an asset. 
 
1.b. International Money: how a national currency can become “the world’s 
currency”? 
 
 An international currency has intrinsically the same functions that a national 
currency has, with the difference that it is extensively used outside the country of 
issuance.  
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 Source: Papaioannou and Portes, 2008 
 
 International money is essentially used by two types of economic agents: public 
agents, such as governments, and private agents like individuals and corporations. 
 As explained by Papaionnou and Portes since money is a store of value it is 
considered a financial asset. Consequently, governments may accumulate international 
currency. From a central bank’s balance sheet perspective this accumulation produces an 
increase in net foreign assets. Private agents may use foreign currency for risk 
diversification, carry trades, and other investment opportunities (including arbitrage and 
speculation). In the function of being a medium of exchange, governments may use an 
international currency as an instrument for intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
On the other hand private actors use international currency for their transactions, for 
example in international trade. Finally, when a currency can be a unit of account 
internationally, monetary authorities from different countries may use it as an anchor for 
pegs. For individuals and corporations the presence of an international currency 
simplifies quotations and price comparisons.  
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Different scholars have analyzed the factors that determine the emergence and the 
maintenance of an international currency. Their findings can be summarized as follows: 
1. Economic size – GDP and trade 
2. Economic strength – growth rates 
3. Financial stability – low inflation, exchange-rate stability 
4. Broad, deep and efficient financial markets 
5. Confidence in the Currency Value 
6. Political stability and geopolitical strength 
7. Network Externalities and Inertia1 
In general the status of international currency is linked to the economic size of the 
country of issuance. Overall, these are large and competitive countries that can create 
economies of scale and reduce marginal costs. 
It is not enough for the economy to be big, but it has to be strong. Commonly 
international currencies belong to economies with a capacity to innovate and propel 
growth. Given the size of the economy, when the country grows it generates such a 
strong demand capable of bringing a bonanza to the rest of the globe. In the same line, a 
contraction of such economy negatively impacts the rest of the world. Therefore, a 
healthy growth with low rates of inflation and stable prospects are also important. 
It is crucial for an international currency to be within a highly liquid and deep 
financial market. According to Cooper (1997) liquid secondary markets allow 
participants to quickly build up or liquidate large positions in the currency without fear of 
capital loss. In Greenspan’s view a well-developed financial system is more likely to 
                                               
1 Papaioannou and Portes, 2008. Also Ewe-Ghee Lim, 2006. I have blended the determinants numerated in 
both articles. 
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attract business from abroad, where financial markets may be less developed or barriers 
to efficiency exist. This possibility makes it cheaper for market participants to borrow or 
invest abroad in an international currency and then exchange the proceeds for domestic 
currency, rather than conduct the transactions directly at home. 
Any currency essentially depends on trust. When people accept a currency as a 
mean of payment, they trust the issuance institution behind the currency. The currency is 
nothing but a claim against that institution. In this sense both the currency and the 
institution should be stable. Political stability is related to the geopolitical strength of the 
country, hence, a country with a strong geopolitical presence and stable institutions may 
result extremely attractive for investors. However, a perception of decrease in the 
geopolitical strength may seriously damage the value of a currency causing shifts to 
others.  
Finally, there is a determinant that is certainly hard to measure but seems to be 
extremely important, these are network externalities and the inertia associated with them. 
This implies an increase in the value of the currency as more people use it. Then, as 
people get use to it, it takes a lot of time to shift to another asset. There are many 
econometrics studies on this issue, though; a very simple explanation can illustrate what 
might be happening. Whenever we talk about a shift to a second currency, there is an 
implied assumption that a substitution effect is possible and that the consumer, or in this 
case the investor, is indifferent among the two goods. But, at some point and after years 
of choosing the same good, even when a currency is intrinsically a homogenous good, it 
could create a “brand effect”. In this sense people use to this “brand”, simply attach to it. 
This “stickiness” can be interpreted as inertia towards the brand, in this case the currency. 
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1.c. The Dollar as an international Currency 
 
It was not until the end of World War II that the dollar became a real global 
currency. During the Bretton Woods conferences, few countries accorded a system to 
manage their commercial and financial relations. Financial stability was one of the main 
goals in the conference. In order to achieve this goal two major decisions where take. 
First, the International Monetary Fund was created as a supervisor. Second, a system of 
fixed exchange rates was formed, this allowed for the use of the dollar as a reserve 
currency. By that time, only the USD could provide the necessary liquidity to the system. 
The United States government fixed the value of the dollar at $35 per ounce of gold and 
committed to supply full convertibility. So, members were required to establish a parity 
of their national currencies to a peg and to maintain exchange rates within a band of 1%. 
The system was based on the idea that the USD was “as good as gold”. In fact, 
accumulating USD was still more desirable than holding gold because it paid an interest. 
By the early 70’s the system was suffering from a series of shocks, in part related to 
episodes in the Middle East. At the end of 1971 the G-10 met and through the 
“Smithsonian Agreements” accorded to devaluate the dollar. However, this arrangement 
could not be implemented. In 1972 many currencies abandoned their pegs to the dollar. In 
1973, the Bretton Woods system collapsed and currencies were allowed to float. In spite 
of this, the dollar is still the strongest international currency in the world. “As Mark 
Twain might have said, reports of the dollar’s death have been greatly exaggerated. The 
dollar is still the dominant reserve currency for central banks and governments. The share 
of international reserves in dollars has actually been rising, not falling. The market in 
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U.S. treasury securities is still the single most liquid financial market in the world, which 
makes it attractive for central banks to hold their reserves in this form. The dollar is still 
the dominant invoicing and vehicle currency in international trade. Petroleum and other 
commodities are still invoiced in dollars. There are, of course, good reasons for 
questioning whether this will remain the case.” (Eichengreen, 2005) 
 
1.d. Dollar versus Euro, a debate 
 
According to the Ewe-Ghee Lim, some scholars like Bergsten (1997), Mundell 
(1998), and Portes and Rey (1998), were optimistic the single currency of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would challenge the dollar immediately and even 
replace it eventually as the dominant currency. Indeed, Bergsten (1997) predicts that “as 
much as $1 trillion of international investment may shift from dollars into euros”; and 
Mundell (1998) predicts that “the euro will become an international currency on the same 
scale as the dollar,” anticipating transition problems from investors shifting out of dollars 
to euros. Other economists, notably Cooper (1997) and McKinnon (1998), were less 
sanguine. McKinnon (1998) argues the euro would only be an important regional 
currency, although this argument “in no way denigrate[s] the great contribution the euro 
could make to…the greater European economy (p. 60). Since 1999, other studies have 
been conducted, but the issue remains unsettled. McKinnon (2001, 2002, 2003) and 
Kenen (2002, 2003) see dollar dominance continuing, but Eichengreen (2005) is 
optimistic about the euro’s prospects as a reserve currency. Taking a more historical 
perspective, Bordo (2003) and Dwyer and Lothian (2003) are cautiously optimistic, while 
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Chinn and Frankel (2005) project a possible large role using econometric estimates. 
(Ewe-Ghee Lim, IMF, 2006).  
Today may be the most interesting debate is being held among Chinn and Frankel 
(2008) on the one side and Posen (2008) on the other. While the first authors declared 
that “the Euro may over the next 15 years surpass the dollar as leading international 
currency”, the second author basically answered “why the Euro will not rival the dollar”.   
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2. Dollar Depreciation and Emergence of the Euro 
 
 
2.a. The Big Dollar, fluctuations and its depreciation 
 
From 1998 to 2001 the USD’s value increased dramatically. However, since its 
last peak in 2001, there has been a trend towards depreciation. Graph 1 shows two 
indexes constructed from the spot historical values of foreign exchanges against the USD. 
Index 1 gives a higher weigh to the Eurozone and other European currencies, while Index 
2 is based on trade weighted relations. As observe in the graph the dollar depreciation 
against the first index is much stronger. 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Index 1
Euro 57.60%
Yen 13.60%
British Pound 11.90%
CAD 9.10%
SEK 4.20%
CHF 3.60%
Index 2
2000-
2008
1995-
2000
euro 18.0% 19.0%
Canada 16.0% 16.0%
Japan 10.0% 15.0%
Mexico 10.0% 9.0%
China 15.0% 7.0%
UK 5.0% 6.0%
Taiwan 3.0% 4.0%
Korea 4.0% 5.0%
Brazil 2.0% 2.0%
India 2.0% 1.0%
australia 2.0% 2.0%
Hong Kong 2.0% 3.0%
Venezuela 1.0% 1.0%
Switzerland 2.0% 2.0%
S. Arabia 1.0% 1.0%
Malaysia 2.0% 2.0%
Sweden 1.0% 1.0%
Israel 1.0% 1.0%
Russia 1.0% 1.0%
Singapore 2.0% 2.0%
100.0% 100.0%
Table 1                                                             Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What caused the depreciation? The question can partially be explained by looking 
at the monetary and fiscal policies of the time in the United States. The following 
paragraphs are taken from the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: 
“The impressive performance of the U.S. economy persisted in the first half of 
2000 with economic activity expanding at a rapid pace. Overall rates of inflation were 
noticeably higher, largely as result of steep increase in energy prices… Because price 
stability is essential to achieving maximum sustainable economic growth, heading off 
these pressures has been critical to extending the extraordinary performance of the U.S. 
economy. To promote balance between aggregate demand and potential supply and 
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contain inflation pressures, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) took 
additional firming actions this year, raising the benchmark federal funds rate 1 
percentage point between February and May”. (Monetary Report to Congress July 20, 
2000) 
“Last year was a difficult one for the economy of the United States. The slowdown 
in the growth of economic activity that had become apparent in late 2000 intensified in 
the first half of the year. Business slashed investment spending…as actual and 
prospective sales deteriorated, many firms in the factory sector struggled with 
uncomfortable high levels of inventory, and the accompanying declines in manufacturing 
output steepened. At the same time foreign economies also slowed, further reducing the 
demand of U.S. production. The aggressive actions by the Fed to ease the stance of 
monetary policy… The devastating events of September 11 further set back an already 
fragile economy… The economic fallout of the events of September 11 led the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) to cut the federal funds rate…” (Monetary Policy 
Report to Congress, February 27, 2002)    
 
The second half of the 90’s was characterized by volatility as a consequence of a 
series of crises. In 1994 took place the Tequila crisis, and after that the Asian crisis 
followed by the Russian crisis and in the U.S. the Long-Term Capital Management crisis 
occurred. In most of the cases pegs collapsed and strong devaluations materialized. To 
diminish the negative impacts on the economy in the second quarter of 1998 the Fed 
eased monetary policy, naturally there was a short term depreciation of the dollar; 
however given the fast recovery the increase in output soon led to an increase in interest 
rates that adjusted the foreign exchange market and the dollar started to appreciate.  
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From 1998 (4Q) to 2001 the economy really boomed. Growth pace was very fast 
and unemployment was low. Growth in output was mostly driven by a strong domestic 
demand and an increase in equity prices. Income grew less rapidly than expenditures, and 
the personal savings rate declined further, in part the latter was a consequence of the 
appreciation of home-properties that induced a “wealth effect”. Despite the decrease in 
private savings government savings were increasing due to a fiscal surplus. From a 
Balance of Payment (BOP) perspective, the U.S. was having a Current Account deficit; 
however since capital inflows in the period were very high the overall BOP seemed 
sustainable. In addition, given the growth in global demand U.S.’ exports were 
increasing, but due to the wealth effect the marginal propensity to import increased too.   
Regarding inflation, there was an increase particularly in the periods with high 
energy prices. The “core” inflation though, did not increase as much, mainly because the 
U.S. was importing extremely cheap goods from Asia.  However, in the first quarter of 
2000 inflation started to accelerate. This moment can be called the “big dollar” period. 
From the second quarter of 2000 to 2002 we can observe a deceleration in growth 
together with a series of shocks that finally led to a collapse in March 2002. The increase 
in interest rates and the drop in house prices produced a decrease in construction 
investment. So, the swing in mortgage interest rates as well as the slower growth of 
income amid a downturn in the stock market where clear signs of deceleration. 
Growth in consumer spending slowed while producers were hit by a decrease in 
domestic and international demand. The tipping point was naturally September 11 which 
negatively affected sectors like hospitality, tourism, airlines, etc. Soon after the terrorist 
attacks the Fed injected liquidity by massive cuts in interest rates. At the same time there 
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was a decrease in tax revenue and a huge fiscal expansion driven by the war in Middle 
East. As current account deficit increased enormously, the government started to have 
what is known as “twin deficits”: current account and fiscal. Even if there is no 
concluding empirical evidence on the correlation between both, a weak fiscal position 
may diminish the confidence in a currency and produce a “substitution effect” towards 
other currencies. As Mankiw said, “as smaller federal budget deficit would be more 
national saving, less reliance on foreign capital flows, and a smaller trade deficit. The 
trade deficit and the budget deficit are not twins, but they are cousins”. (Mankiw, 2006) 
In addition, as theory states, the sharp decrease in interest rates translated into a 
weakening in the dollar. Since investing abroad provided higher returns the demand for 
dollar assets decreased causing the USD to depreciate. Given the cumulus of problems, 
the expectations of depreciation further pushed the dollar down. During the period of 
monetary easing vulnerabilities were built, such as the extensive increase in mortgage 
demand and household spending. The excess liquidity provided by the Fed ended up 
financing junk investments and irresponsible lending as well as borrowing. 
“From the mid-1990s until early 2002, the strength of foreign demand for dollar 
assets was sufficient to keep the dollar appreciating despite the rapid expansion of the 
trade deficit in this time period. Since 2002, however, although the United States 
continued to receive a rising inflow of capital, the strength of the associated demand for 
dollars has not been sufficient to prevent the dollar from depreciating moderately under 
the weight of large current account deficits in this time period”.2 (Elwell, 2008) 
                                               
2 Craig K. Elwell Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy Government and Finance Division. Dollar Crisis: 
Prospect and Implications. CRS Report for Congress,  January 8, 2008 
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According to Eichengreen (2005), whether the dollar retains its reserve currency 
role depends, first and foremost, on America’s own policies. Serious economic 
mismanagement would lead to the substitution of other reserve currencies for the dollar. 
In this context, serious mismanagement means policies that allow unsustainably large 
current account deficits to persist, lead to the accumulation of large external debts, and 
result in a high rate of U.S. inflation and dollar depreciation. Clearly, this would make 
holding dollar reserves unattractive. This is a lesson of British history in the sense that an 
inflation rate that ran at roughly 3 times U.S. rates over the first three quarters of the 20th 
century, in conjunction with repeated devaluations against the dollar, played a major role 
in sterling’s loss of reserve currency status. 
The depreciation of the dollar meant two types of vulnerabilities: endogenous and 
exogenous. As Eichengreen argued, there was a risk associated to mismanagement; 
however, the increasing dependence of the United States on foreign capital flows, 
particularly flows from countries that were ideological and geopolitical enemies such as 
China and Middle Eastern economies remained to be the highest vulnerability. 
On the other hand there is a huge risk associated to the supervision of the private 
sector, particularly in the financial arena. Wall Street games tended to create huge 
industry bubbles that when burst hit the whole economy, and affected the currency. An 
example was the dot-com bubble. This was a self-perpetuating rise in the share prices of 
stocks in the technology and communication industries. Speculations led to overvaluation 
of internet companies. The stock market plunged in March 2002 when the share prices 
fell dramatically, and many companies went out of business. It was the end of the dot-
com bubble, companies that were too big to fail such as Enron collapsed.  
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NASDAQ Composite 
 
After its sharp collapse the dollar rebounded in 2005, but soon after it continued 
its downward trend, particularly vis-à-vis the Euro. “The broad appreciation of the US 
dollar, the stability of the euro and the overall downward trend of the yen were the 
salient developments in foreign exchange markets over most of 2005. Until December, 
the dollar appreciated markedly against the euro, the yen and a number of other floating 
currencies, in particular the pound sterling and the Australian and New Zealand dollars. 
Its trend vis-à-vis emerging markets’ currencies was less uniform. Asian currencies 
remained fairly stable or depreciated, while some Latin American currencies 
strengthened. Starting in December 2005, the upward trend of the US dollar reversed”. 
(BIS 76th Annual Report) 
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Several factors, centered in the US policy, may explain the depreciation of the 
dollar, however, it is also important to consider policy making in the rest of the world to 
explain these trends as well as variations. In addition, it is crucial to analyze how changes 
in expectation precipitated the depreciation. Broadly, it can be said that the expectations 
for an increase in interest rates in both Europe and Japan combined with the expectations 
of depreciation in the dollar, steepened the decrease in the value of the US dollar. China 
was also announcing an appreciation in the renanmbi against the USA, which further 
contributed to the downward trend. Besides, the increase in commodity prices buttressed 
expectations of lower growth in the United States.  
United States: Fundamental Indicators  
Source: IMF 
In the U.S. the increase in the current account deficit remained worrisome as well 
as the amount of government expenditures. Uncertainty grew given the developments in 
Middle East and the associated higher energy prices that were pushing up inflation, and 
due to the devastating effects of hurricanes. In the end the Fed started increasing interest 
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rates due to inflation expectations, as a consequence both the housing and motor vehicles 
markets cooled. By the beginning of 2005, the reduction of interest rates gave a break to 
the depreciation of the dollar and caused a small rebound. To offset the current account 
deficit, there were capital inflows through the financial account. Most of the foreign 
official inflows were from Asian economies that were purchasing government bonds and 
mortgage backed securities from Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac and Ginnie Mae.  
In Europe the ECB, tightened the monetary policy in the second quarter of 2005 
to cope with inflation expectations. Real GDP in the Euro area accelerated primarily due 
to an increase in consumption spending, employment and investment. However, greater 
energy prices were producing an increase in core inflation above the ECB’s target. So 
monetary tightening was much stronger than in other regions. In this period ECB could 
conduct a monetary policy based on predictability, hence, expectations tended to 
reinforce policy goals. Therefore, the Euro appreciated more than other currencies 
Finally, the current account surpluses in many emerging economies further 
increased the appreciation of these currencies against the dollar. Nonetheless, the current 
account surpluses, particularly in Asian economies, allowed for the accumulation in 
foreign reserves mostly dollar denominated that cushion an even stronger depreciation of 
the dollar.   
Summing up, a variety of causes explained the dollar depreciation, but the most 
important reasons were: A loose monetary policy adopted by the Fed; a loose fiscal 
policy, there was a decrease in tax collection and a massive increase in spending towards 
national security issues; a current account deficit that seemed to increase without control; 
volatility in the stock market, mostly associated to the dot-com bubble burst; and, the 
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emergence of a strong Euro as a competitor for portfolio diversification and debt 
denomination.   
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2.b. The growing role of the Euro 
On 1 January 1999 eleven E.U. Member States – Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland – 
adopted the European Union's single currency, the euro, in what may be considered to be 
the world’s most radical monetary reform since Bretton Woods. This move established 
the second largest single currency area in the world (after the United States), which now 
produces two thirds of the E.U.’s GDP and one fifth of the world’s. Four other EU 
Member States have joined the euro area since its inception: Greece in 2001, Slovenia in 
2007 and Cyprus and Malta in 2008. The area is set to expand further as most EU 
Member States currently outside the euro area are preparing to join at some point in the 
future. (European Commission, 2008) 
As a result of the provisions expressed on the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, in 1999 
the Euro was adopted. In order to be part of the “Eurozone” members should met 
monetary and budgetary requirements. The most important conditions included a budget 
deficit of less than 3% of GDP, low inflation rates that tended to converge to the overall 
average, and a debt to GDP ratio lower than 60%. In addition, they had to realign their 
exchanges. Therefore, it is clear that macroeconomic stability and healthy financials was 
one of the crucial goals of the European Commission. Unlike the loose fiscal and 
monetary policies that were being implemented in the United States, the European 
counterparts were converging towards economic discipline. This search for stability and 
discipline not only provided credibility to institutions but also was crucial in order to 
coordinate policies.  
 
 21 
Budgetary discipline has been reinforced by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
which was reformed in 2005. According to the European Commission (2008) there was 
an impressive consolidation of fiscal policy. This allowed for a reduction in fiscal deficits 
to 0.6% of GDP in 2007. In fact ten members, including Germany, either recorded a 
budget surplus in 2007 or were very close to balance. While not fully eradicated, pro-
cyclical fiscal policies have also become less common. Unlike monetary policy, fiscal 
policy remains in the hands of member states, therefore proper coordination is always a 
challenge. The lack of a centralized fiscal policy is one of the major vulnerabilities of the 
European system in crisis management situations. 
Monetary discipline was implemented to pursue an inflation target of 2%. 
Consequently there was a convergence to low inflation rates. However, inflation has 
increased due to a boom in commodity prices.  
In these past years the Eurozone succeeded in constructing an environment of 
macroeconomic stability and low interest rates. This together with the creation of the 
Structural Cohesion Funds has ensured the conditions for an accelerated catching up of 
new member states.  
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All these changes fostered financial markets integration. Interbank money markets 
have reached full integration and cross-border transactions have been increasing. Also, 
the disappearance of exchange risk and lower cross-border transactions costs has helped 
to further increase product integration. In the same line this decline in risk premiums 
allowed for an expansion of capital formation to 22% 3of GDP.  
Macroeconomic stability seeded the ground for an increase in the international 
role of the Euro. The external position was in balance, there were credible institutions and 
macroeconomic framework as well as a sound financial system. Hence, the euro area has 
been contributing to an orderly evolution of the global economy.   
The introduction of the new currency was not easy. Soon after it was launched the 
Euro depreciated in the exchange rates market. In particular, the Euro fell strongly 
against the USD. From an introduction at USD1.18 per Euro, the currency depreciated to 
a low of $0.8228/€ on October 2000. Once European institutions, in particular the 
European Central Bank, started to gain investors’ confidence and the economy of the 
region started to grow the currency began steadily appreciating. By July 2002 it gained 
parity versus the USD, and after it appreciated against it. On 2003 the Euro surpassed its 
initial trading value. 
While the Euro was appreciating the USD was depreciating vis-à-vis other major 
currencies, however the depreciation against Euro and GBP were by far the strongest. 
Hence, it represented not only the trend of a USD depreciation related to America’s 
monetary and fiscal mismanagements, but also the trend of a Euro appreciation that 
resulted from predictable ECB’s policies. In November 2005 the euro again began to rise 
                                               
3 Data taken from European Commission Report. “10 years of the Euro”. 2008. 
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steadily against the U.S. dollar, and on July 2008, the euro rose to an all-time high of 
$1.5990 (€0.6254/$).   
“The figures suggest central banks diversified out of the dollar as it fell to the 
lowest level in a decade. Investors sold a record amount of U.S. securities in August 
when defaults on subprime mortgages rippled through financial markets and the Federal 
Reserve signaled it would cut interest rates. ``The dollar seems to be losing, at least to 
some small extent, its favored status,'' said David Powell, a currency strategist at IDEA 
global in New York. ``Foreign central banks aren't necessarily shunning dollar assets, but 
they were more attracted to other currencies.” 4 
 
EUR/USD 
Source: Yahoo-Finance 
 
                                               
4 Bloomberg Dec. 2007. 
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Clearly, governments have been increasing their holdings in Euros. While the 
percentage of USD reserves has been falling since 2005, there has been an increase in the 
percentage of claims in Euros. In fact from 2000 to 2008 there has been a 9% raise in 
disclosed reserves. During the past years emerging countries has been running current 
account surpluses and accumulating international reserves. The increase in foreign 
exchange reserves has been growing at an accelerated pace.  Essentially this responded to 
a boom in commodity prices together with an increase in the Chinese demand. Also, 
many Asian countries need to allocate surpluses in foreign reserves to avoid an 
appreciation of their currencies.  
 
 
Many scholars think that being the main currency of reserve gives an extremely 
high segniorage privilege. “If the dollar loses part of its reserve status, this would reduce 
the <<exorbitant privilege>> of the United States, which is able to finance large and 
prolonged current account deficits in its own currency and to maintain higher returns on 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008E
Claims in U.S. dollars Claims in euros Claims in pounds sterling
Claims in Japanese yen Claims in other currencies Claims in Swiss francs
 $1,518   $1,569  
 $1,796  
 $2,223  
 $2,655   $2,843  
 $3,315  
 $4,069   $4,368  
 71%  72% 
 67%  66% 
 66%  67% 
 65% 
 64%  62% 
 18%  19% 
 24% 
 25% 
 25%  24% 
 25% 
 26%  27% 
Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) - (US$ in billions)
Source: IMF.
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its foreign currency assets that foreigners achieve on their dollar assets” (Papaionnou, 
Portes, 2005) 
The Euro’s role as a trade invoicing or settlement currency has also risen. It has 
become more than 50% of the euro area's external trade and 60% of trade in third 
countries that are either neighbors or candidates for membership. It also plays an 
important role as an anchor or reference currency in the managed exchange rate regimes 
of about 40 countries.5 The Euro has become an anchor currency for countries like Cape 
Verde or Bosnia and Herzegovina.  23 states and territories have currencies that are 
directly pegged to the euro including 14 countries in mainland Africa, 2 African island 
countries, 3 French Pacific territories and a Balkan country. 
 A significant market in euro-denominated private-sector bonds has emerged, with 
an annual gross issuance of more than €1 trillion now substantially exceeding the 
approximately €800 billion raised through public sector issuance. Equity markets too 
have integrated faster than elsewhere, with the share of equity held in other euro-area 
countries rising from 20% to 40%. Financial markets infrastructure has advanced and 
progress has been made in cross-border wholesale financial services, while the Single 
Euro Payments Area is set to eliminate differences between national and cross-border 
transactions achieved via the implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan and 
the operation of the Lamfalussy committees.6 
It is very important to open a parenthesis and make a reference about the United 
Kingdom (U.K.). As it is globally know, the U.K is not part of the Eurozone. However, 
London has been the financial center that has allowed for the expansion of the Euro in the 
                                               
5 Idem. 
6 Idem. 
 26 
foreign exchange market. Most of the projections on the “Euro v.s USD as the future 
international currency” as well many European scholars have emphasize that if the U.K. 
becomes part of the Eurozone, soon after the Euro would be able to surpass the dollar. 
Main Countries for Foreign Exchange Trading
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Will this crisis force London to the Eurozone or will the U.K. tend to isolate? In 
the opinion of Wolfgang Münchau the U.K. may love the Euro as a result of: 1) Long-
term economic costs; 2) The City has managed to remain the Eurozone’s financial centre, 
even though the UK is firmly outside. We should not take this situation for granted. The 
transaction-based system of financial capitalism suited London better than Frankfurt or 
Paris. Regulatory revenge will push offshore activities back onshore and the relative 
attractiveness of the City of London will be correspondingly reduced. The UK will at 
some point have to make a choice whether it wants to be in the Eurozone or whether it 
wants to seek an alternative use for those rather tall buildings in the heart of London; 3) 
Political economy. There will be more economic governance at Eurozone level in the 
future. 4) The UK’s macroeconomic policy framework may simply not survive this crisis. 
There must now be a risk of a real sterling crisis at some point, something significantly 
more alarming than the tremors felt last week. As Willem Buiter noted the UK is in many 
respects comparable to Iceland. It is bigger of course, but still tiny in relation to the 
global economy, with a sick financial sector that accounts for several times gross 
domestic product.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 Wolfgang Münchau. Why the British may decide to love the euro. Financial Times. Published: November 
16 2008 18:12 | Last updated: November 16 2008 18:12 
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3. Financial Crisis and Dollar appreciation: Going Green? 
“The financial turmoil began in the market for US subprime mortgages, and the 
markets for structured products based on them. Delinquency rates in the subprime market 
had started to rise in early 2005, almost contemporaneously with outright declines in house 
prices, but there was no significant market response to this development until early 2007. 
Credit spreads on such products then began to widen, rating downgrades increased, and the 
process accelerated sharply in August. The trigger…was the decision by a small number of 
investment funds to freeze redemptions, citing an inability to value their complex assets. 
From this small beginning, the financial disruption then fanned out to virtually every corner 
of the system. By early August, a combination of growing concerns about the valuations of 
complex products, liquidity risk and counterparty risk had led to a host of other markets 
being negatively affected. There was an effective collapse of the market for structured 
products based on mortgages, a massive withdrawal of investors from the asset-backed 
commercial paper market, and a sudden drying-up of interbank term money markets in the 
major currencies. This last development manifested itself in the form of an unprecedented 
gap between expected policy interest rates (over a one- to three-month horizon) and the rates 
at which the largest banks were prepared to lend to each other. While it was almost 
inevitable that difficulties in the subprime market would eventually have some repercussions 
for the financial institutions at the centre of this market, the force and speed of the impact 
took virtually everyone by surprise.” (BIS, 78th Annual Report) 
The present financial crisis developed in different phases. From a balance sheet 
perspective, the first phase was related to a decrease in the value of the assets. In fact, 
delinquency and defaults in mortgage payments led to a decrease in the value of assets 
attached to the mortgage business.  Then, on the liability side banks had a constraint in 
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financing, basically given the lack of transparency, panic and the increase in counterparty 
risk banks did not want to lend to each other. Most financial institutions tried to raise 
capital from funds in Middle East and Asia. However when the value of equity dropped, 
the credit squeeze turned into a credit crunch.  
From a policy making perspective the response and the grade of intervention of 
the Fed can also be divided into different phases. When the ABX-HE indices fell, the 
markets dried. Panic soon led to volatility. The Fed found itself in a huge dilemma. It 
could low the interest rates in order to inject liquidity to help banks, it could also 
intervene but this could increase the moral hazard linked to any bail out. Moreover, any 
cut on interest would create inflation in the future. In the end, the Fed started to decrease 
the rates. Then it provided a “term auction facility” to loan commercial banks. The 
second phase implied its direct intervention to “save” Bear Stearns in March 2008. The 
Fed announced it would lend JP Morgan $29 billion in a non recourse loan collateralized 
with some assets of Bear Stearns. In addition the Fed created other “term securities 
lending facilities” for investment banks. The third phase was the application of “good” 
bank v.s. “bad” bank logic8, and was implemented when it let Lehman Brothers fall. 
Apparently, the idea behind was to reduce moral hazard and also allow for bad assets to 
emerge. At the same time on September the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) put 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under conservatorship. This led to the fourth phase: 
government intervention to carry the burden of bad assets and “clean” the system. Finally, the 
Secretary of the Treasury announced the “Troubled Assets Relief Program” (TARP), by 
which the Fed would inject liquidity by taking capital position.  The first company was AIG, 
                                               
8 The same logic was applied in other crises, in other countries. For example in the “Northern crisis” in 
Europe. (International Banking class notes) 
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soon most of the big banks received capital. As we can observe the crisis went from the asset 
side to the liability side and the solution from the liability side to the asset side. The final 
phase was related to global action, this means the action of joining the authorities of main 
Central Banks to find a global solution and implement new standards for supervision. 
The U.S. dollar reached a bottom in mid July and then started to rebound. The 
latter seemed an anomaly in the context of a crisis. The first rebound was a direct 
consequence of the liquidity crunch. Since banks were not lending to each other, money 
demand (US dollars) exceeded money supply, hence the price of the dollar went up. 
Many argue that this is wrong because in theory this would have increased interest rates 
and the Fed Funds (FF) rate has decreased. Nonetheless, since there has been a “brake 
down” in the pass-through from economic policy to the real functioning of the economy 
we should observe not the FF rates but the interbank rates. During this period Libor rates 
increased dramatically so as the gap measured by the TED spread. Therefore, I would 
argue that there is a rationale behind this first dollar rally that is consistent with the 
theory; however, I believe that a long-term appreciation would damage the United States’ 
economy since it will impede a current account deficit correction. During the “Black 
September” the dollar fell again due to the accumulated volatility (Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, AIG, Ginnie, Freddy, Fannie). Then in October and after the TARP 
became law (HR 1424, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008) the dollar 
rebounded again. So, why people were going green? A) The US dollar appears to be the 
safest asset in the middle of the crisis because of credibility of American institutions; B) 
because most other countries had dollar denominated claims (and would be an extremely 
bad deal if the dollar depreciates); C) because apparently the U.S. will “reach” the bottom 
first and get out of the crisis first, and Europe will not be fast enough to coordinate its 
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response (particularly fiscal); D) because of short-term covering; E) because the U.S. has 
the “money printing machine” at home. Many of these arguments have been presented in 
the last few days; some are simply based on speculation. Many reasons have been 
presented. But I think that the question is: what is the risk of going green? 
For the period 2002-2007 we observed a depreciation of the US dollar. A massive 
depreciation was cushioned by what Ben Bernanke called “the global savings glut”. 
Many scholars were calling for a “soft launch”. The crisis, led to a fast appreciation of the 
dollar that is barely linked to the fundamentals of the economy. In theory, and as 
discussed above, a decrease in interest rate would led to a depreciation of the currency. It 
is true that most governments have been easing; however, the percentage change in rates 
has been much higher in the US. The increase in money supply was also accompanied by 
a gigantic fiscal expansion. Even after the colossal input of liquidity and the expansive 
fiscal policy the expected change in output remains low. Since the increase in output is 
weak the force that would truly lead to a currency appreciation is fragile. On the other 
hand, the appreciation of the dollar makes the economy less competitive vis-à-vis other 
countries and therefore is not allowing for a correction in the current account deficit. 
Hence, net exports will remain negative. The two things that are actually narrowing the 
current account deficit are the decrease in growth a therefore a decrease in the marginal 
propensity to import (as consumption has contracted) and the reduction of commodity 
prices.   
To conclude with, we have a country with a huge fiscal deficit, a current account 
deficit, low future output with loose monetary policy but a probable increase in private 
savings. The described situation is similar to that of 2002, however, in 2002 the dollar 
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depreciation started to allow for a gradual correction in imbalances; now, the appreciation 
of the dollar is not allowing for that correction. The biggest risk is to have a dollar crisis; 
this is a massive depreciation in the future. Along with this, when prices adjust, the 
increase in money supply would generate inflation, unless of course, the US ended up 
consuming massive amounts of cheap Chinese goods. The latter makes the American 
economy doubly dependent. First, in order to finance its fiscal efforts the government 
will need Asian economies to buy US assets. Second, to maintain inflation low the 
government will keep importing goods and widened the current account deficit. This will 
basically be a revival of what Robert Triffin noticed was occurring in 1960. Triffin noted 
that if the U.S. failed to keep running deficits the system would lose its liquidity, not be 
able to keep up with the world's economic growth, and, thus, bring the system to a halt. 
But incurring such payment deficits also meant that, over time, the deficits would erode 
confidence in the dollar as the reserve currency created instability.9 Also, if it is true that 
the US will be the first country to recover from the crisis, most of that recovery may be 
led by an increase in consumption. If consumption increases and the dollar price remains 
high then the propensity to import will be enormous and the current account deficit will 
further wider. So, even if the US could run a current account deficit for 20 years more 
(theoretically there is nothing bad against a current account deficit) the economic cost 
and the political cost of dependence could be too high.  
 
 
                                               
9 Triffin, Robert." Britannica Book of the Year, 1994. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 6 Apr. 2006 
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9113363>. 
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TED Spread 2008 
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What happened on the other side of the Atlantic? At the begging of the crisis 
European leaders expressed that the current financial crisis was an “American” crisis. 
They seemed to be reluctant to accept that the turmoil would eventually affect them. 
Today, their involvement is not an option. It has been clearly understood that the current 
crisis is a global one. Therefore, global solutions are needed.  
Europe's coordinated rescue efforts have for now prevented more serious 
disruptions in the financial sector. Different European Governments have been injecting 
capital since late October 2008 and have also guaranteed banks' liabilities until the end of 
2009. Despite these measure coupled with the recent announcement by the Bank of 
England and the European Central Bank to cut rates further, based on Credit Suisse 
research data, banks left 240 billion euros on deposit with the European Central Bank 
(ECB) last Friday illustrating that "the new measures are succeeding in supplying 
liquidity to the system, but that banks are hoarding cash rather than lending it to each 
other".10 
The German financial rescue plan announced in October reached nearly €500 
billion or close to 20% of Germany's GDP. The Government announced that 
approximately 80% of the funds will be directed to a federal fund to provide banks’ loan 
guarantee, while the remaining €80 billion should be used to recapitalize banks and, if 
necessary, buy risky assets. 
France's plan totaled €360 billion or just below 20% of GDP with €320 billion to 
guarantee new debt issued by banks while €40 billion is expected to be injected in a 
second fund used for bank recapitalizations. According to a report released by Credit 
Suisse, the difference between the German and French plans is mainly on the funding 
                                               
10 Credit Suisse. Euro area and UK Economics: Call it unconventional. (December, 2008) 
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side. One of the important aspects of the French plan is that banks will have to pledge 
credits to the private sector in exchange for cash. 
The French government has announced that six banks will be receiving capital to 
strengthen their balance sheets for a total of €10.5 billion by the end of this year, using 
roughly a quarter of the fund’s available cash. The investment is expected to take the 
form of subordinated debt with a return of 400 basis points above the risk-free rate. These 
banks have agreed on a plan to provide for a “3 to 4% increase in lending to companies, 
households and local governments.”11 
The Italian Treasury also announced the launch of a fund, the emergency 
stabilization fund, to provide loans to banks to ease liquidity stresses. The Italian 
Government has also announced plans to inject capital in banks deemed under-capitalized 
by the Bank of Italy thought no further actions have been taken since the announcement.  
Finally, the Spain's package amounts to around 13% of GDP and includes a fund 
to buy assets from banks and a guarantee for new bank debts and is expected to provide 
the option of capital injections directly into banks with below par capitalization. 
BNP Paribas has also won European Union approval to buy the Belgian and 
Luxembourg banking arms Fortis while Government bailouts for Fortis given by 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in September and October are expected to be 
cleared in the next few weeks. In October, BNP Paribas became the largest holder of 
private savings in the 15-nation euro area when it agreed to acquire most of Fortis assets 
a week after a state rescue failed to keep the bank afloat.  
                                               
11 Credit Suisse. ECB Watch Giant leap or small step? Research Report. (December, 2008) 
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UBS shareholders', which suffered the most in the U.S. subprime contagion, have 
voted in favor of government funds amid rising concerns and increased fears of a 
deepening recession. Approximately 98% of UBS' shareholders voted in favor of the 
creation of conditional share capital for the issuance of mandatory convertible notes in 
the amount of CHF 6 billion to the Swiss Confederation. The news followed reports that 
former UBS executives have returned as much as 70 million Swiss francs ($58.3 million) 
in bonuses after the company posted a record loss that is forcing the bank to take 
additional aid from the government. The Swiss Government agreed to say it will provide 
UBS with loans up to $54 billion, in addition to infusing capital in the European bank. In 
return, the bank will allow the government to own a 9% stake in collateral. 
There has also been a response from the European Central Bank by increasing 
capital markets liquidity. First, the ECB enlarged the provision of liquidity at its regular 
weekly main refinancing operations in October. Second, the ECB is more extensively 
using open market operations that were rarely adopted before. Third, the ECB reduced 
the corridor of standing facilities from 200 basis points to 50 basis points and 100 basis 
points to 25 basis points around the interest rate of the MROs. This implies that the 
marginal lending rate is now set at 4.25% and the deposit rate at 3.25%. Fourth, since 
December 2007, the central bank is providing US dollar liquidity to euro area banks on 
behalf of the Fed against ECB eligible collateral. As President Trichet indicated, 
“counterparties in these operations will be able to borrow any amount they wish against 
appropriate collateral in each jurisdiction. This is a “world premiere” in exceptionally 
confident cooperation between central banks.” 
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More recently, the European Central Bank has announced a 75 basis points cut to 
2.50% on their target rate; the boldest change so far in the ECB’s history and following 
an unexpected 175 basis points cut of the Swedish Riksbank and a 100 basis points cut by 
the Bank of England. The Swedish Riksbank has reached 2% and has explicitly stated 
that it intends to remain at that level.  
These unprecedented events have combined to create an extremely volatile 
environment and contributed to a steep depreciation of the Euro relative to the U.S. 
dollar. After reaching its peak in July 2008, the Euro as well as the British Pound have 
consistently fall against the U.S. dollar. The Sub Prime Crisis that many we believe 
started in June 2007 gave the United States a leg up and allowed the country to start 
tightening economic policy earlier than its European counterparts. Thus, expected rate 
cuts in the Euro zone have contributed to a depreciation of the Euro currencies. From 
another perspective, there were significant leveraged positions against the U.S. dollar 
than had to be settled, again increasing the demand for this safe heaven security. Despite 
early expectations that the crisis would not reach Europe, investors have changed their 
views after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in October 2008 and have searched for 
refugee in what they believe are “low risk” securities, i.e. the U.S. dollar. 
There are still three main challenges for Europeans to face a crisis of this 
magnitude. On the one hand, each country preserve its own fiscal policy, hence a 
coordinate counter-cyclical action is very difficult to be implemented. The crisis has 
shown that the monetary stimulus is not enough to bring the economy back. Therefore, 
unlike America where the Federal government manages the fiscal policy for all states 
European individual policies could damage the overall regional recovery. On the other 
 39 
hand potential growth remains extremely low in Europe. Productivity growth has decline 
from 1.5% in 1990s to less than 1%. The Euro area per capita income is lower than in the 
US. All these show that Europe will need more time to recover from a crisis than the 
American counterpart. Finally, European banking system is still fragmented. Europe will 
have work towards better regulations of the banking system at the national level and also 
at the regional level. Standards related to cross-border risks management should be 
discussed in Brussels. David Mayes from the Bank of Finland said there is still too much 
scope for supervisory discretion at the country level. He called for a more rules-based 
system of prompt corrective action, which could give authorities in one country more 
confidence that other country authorities' would intervene into a troubled bank relatively 
early and take it over before its capital is depleted… Even though views differed on 
specifics, most people agreed that the E.U.'s 27 member countries and Europe as a whole 
must be better prepared to prevent, manage, and resolve bank failures. And no one 
doubted that the current crisis would lead to a questioning of the very foundations of 
modern finance. (IMF, 2008) 
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Some Thoughts 
During the past six years many scholars doubted about the sustainability of the 
U.S. twin or “cousins” deficits, in terms of Mankiw. In theory there is no reason why a 
country cannot run a current account deficit as long as it receives enough capital flows. 
What has been pointed out is that the rate of increase in flows was weaker than the pace 
of increase in both current account and fiscal deficits. The current crisis implies a huge 
fiscal effort since the pass through from monetary policy to output present a similar 
situation to that called “liquidity trap”. The fiscal effort will naturally widen the U.S. 
deficit. However, the U.S.’ private savings (even if they are expected to grow) are not 
enough to finance this increase while public tax collection is expected to decrease. In this 
regards, the U.S’ rescue plan depends on Asia and Middle Eastern savings; mostly Asian 
savings due to the decrease in oil prices. Is there a market for new bonds if low interest 
rates should mean that investing in the U.S. is less attractive? The paradox is that getting 
out of the crisis depends on a further increase in global imbalances. In theory it could 
work, in practice I think it may be politically difficult for emerging countries with vast 
poor majorities to keep financing the developed world expenditures. And for the U.S. it 
will be increasingly costly too, in both political terms and economic terms. A dollar 
appreciation will further increase the U.S’ economic difficulties.   
The United States not only has more resources than the European Union it can 
implement polices in a more homogenous way. European countries will always be 
submerging in a dilemma between what is better for the nation and what is better for the 
Union. Hopefully, good policy coordination would match both. However, in times of 
crisis this is more difficult. Also, even if many macroeconomic fundamentals converged, 
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each member is different and the system needs to be flexible enough to allow for some 
diversity in policy making. In this sense, efficient and coordinated (not equal) fiscal 
policy is among the greatest difficulties that Europe will need to face. In particular, 
because monetary policy –one of the major successes of the Union– is not enough to 
solve the crisis.  According to Alesina and Tabellini (2008) monetary policy alone is not 
enough to support aggregate demand. Investment and consumption decisions are being 
postponed throughout the world, squeezed by the credit crunch and by self-fulfilling and 
hopefully overly gloomy expectations of a major contraction. Aggregate demand needs to 
be sustains by fiscal policy. The EMU's fiscal policy coordination mechanisms are more 
in flux and under pressure than desire, the crisis promoted the decision to relax the target 
to balance budgets by 2010 - at least for France and Italy. This type of decision should 
have implied at least a brief discussion within the members first, before its announcement 
at the national level.  
In addition, a huge effort should be directed to buttress the banking system and 
cross-border financial transactions. There is no doubt that better regulation is needed 
specifically regarding risk management, derivative products and financial institutions in 
general. 
While the “pre-crisis monetary and fiscal policies” were much sound in Europe 
than in the U.S, slow growth and weak productivity are still major vulnerabilities. The 
strength of consumption in Europe is also weaker than in the U.S. On the whole, this 
means that the recovery capacity of Europe is lower. In part, this contributes to 
explaining the recent dollar rally. However, the European external position is “healthier” 
to that of the United States. In this sense, given that many countries, including Germany, 
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have been running current account surpluses there is less dependence on external 
financing. 
So, will the Euro surpass the dollar? After this crisis I believe that the dollar price 
will tend to increase, with strong fluctuations, at least for the next months. Historically, 
the increase in the dollar price coincides with an increase in reserve accumulation on that 
currency. After both sides of the Atlantic adjust (2009-2010) it is possible that a 60% 
USD holding and 28 % EUR will coexist with a major increase in “other currencies” 
holdings. Also, we have to keep in mind that a huge amount of foreign exchange holdings 
is not disclosed. So most econometric models that are based on this variable are subject to 
incurred in gross errors when forecasting scenarios.        
Subsequent to the crisis most voices called upon more regulation. However, the 
system certainly does not need more. It needs a different approach. Markets change too 
fast and regulations adjust too slowly. The first transformation should be to cover this 
gap. Global regulation should be flexible enough to be applicable to different geographies 
and to different times. The new framework should not only cover the banking sector but 
financial institutions as a whole. It is crucial to reach a fast adjustment that can cover the 
emergence of new products and actors such as derivatives, special purpose vehicles, etc. 
New standards to assess systematic risks are needed as well as a complete revision of the 
rating systems. Also transparency regarding sources of funding and leverage limits is 
needed. It is true that better regulations are necessary. Though, I strongly believe that 
government should focus, first, on how the crisis will impact on the structure of the 
financial system particularly in a situation of information asymmetry. And, second, on 
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the foreign exchange market as a tool to face further imbalances, which implies 
controlling competitive devaluations.  
All major crisis represent pain and challenges but also huge opportunities to bring 
positive changes. It depends on our leaders to pursue the creation of enhanced institutions 
and ensure the lifestyles of their populations. Crisis need fast and pragmatic responses, 
however, this should not mean shortsighted solutions.  
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